Human Factors, Ethics and Morality in Killer UAS

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has been a trial theater for today’s deadliest UAS that are increasing in numbers in the U.S. armed arsenal.  Deployment of UAS into battle fields took place during the Vietnam war to carry out intelligent, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions.  The Second Gulf war also saw an intensive use of UAS, however, those systems carried out more sophisticated sensory systems.  Nowadays, the Predator and the Reaper are capable of ISR missions that can last nearly 24 hours each, in addition to carrying out precision strikes.

Cognitive dissonance and moral disengagement

From a pilot’s perspective, flying an UAS half-way across the globe alleviates the most significant part of battle deployment; fear of being killed.  Fear has been a determining factor in the battle field throughout history as battles were lost when panic possessed an army. Another significant factor is resistance to killing; where soldiers are not inclined to actively engage in acts of killing.  In the case of military UAS pilots, they are not subject to fear while performing their combat duties from cubical-like ground control stations (GCS), nor they are directly involved in the consequences of their actions.  There is a high possibility for moral and emotional disengagement from all occurrences on the battlefield associated with cognitive dissonance induced by camouflaging the use of naked force.  One quote of a young pilot from the book Wired for War demonstrates this state of disengagement  “It's like a video game. It can get a little bloodthirsty. But it's fucking cool” (Singer 2009, p. 308–309).  On the other hand, UAS pilots are subject to larger visual exposure to the aftermath of a strike, especially when surveying the operation theater through high resolution cameras.  The views on this matter are subjective and require further research on the long and short term effects to determine the extent of the assumed moral disengagement (Sharkey, 2010).

Targeted killings

Targeted killings as a preemptive action against alleged members of terrorist organizations is another debatable issue.  The decision making process and the intelligence information to coin a decision to target a wanted figure and possibly accept a certain extent of collateral loss of life are questionable and determining criteria are subjective at best (Sharkey, 2010).

Just War

The Just War.  Military operations of UAS raise concerns in regards to their ability to operate in accordance to Jus in Bello.  Their 4-D’s capability also reduce the threshold of Jus Ad Bellum causing nations to wage a war due to an unbalanced views on the repercussions of war (Strawser, 2010).

References

Singer, P. W. (2009). Wired for war: The robotics revolution and conflict in the 21st century. Penguin.
Sharkey, N. (2010). The Moral Case Against Autonomous and Semiautonomous UAVs. In Handbook of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (pp. 2919-2932). Springer Netherlands.

Strawser, B. J. (2010). Moral predators: The duty to employ uninhabited aerial vehicles. Journal of Military Ethics, 9(4), 342-368.

Operational Risk Managemen

Automated Takeoff and Landing

The auto-land system enables an aircraft to automatically carry out all required maneuvers during the approach and the landing phase of a flight.  This function is carried out by the autopilot system.
Auto-land systems were introduced in 1968 and represented a remarkable achievement in the aviation industry on a Caravelle AIR INTER aircraft (Airbus, 2001).  The purpose of auto-land systems is to allow operations in poor meteorological conditions that hinder the flight crew visual perception and thus achieving economical value and remarkable safety to the airline industry under such challenging conditions (Airbus, 2001).

On a manned aircraft like an Airbus A320, the auto-land function requires a number of systems to be operational, like the autopilot function, FMGS (Flight Management and Guidance System), auto-thrust, nose-wheel steering, and auto-breaks.  The availability of all of these systems will allow fully automated landing, rollout on centerline, and braking of the airplane on an adequately equipped runway without any visual reference or pilot interference (Airbus, 2001).

Such approach is classified under CAT II or CAT III-A, B, and C. CAT II requires the acquisitions of minimal visual cues by the flight crew to assure the aircraft position prior to landing and maybe carried out with a only one auto-pilot, one FMGS, and without auto-thrust, nose-wheel steering, and auto-brake following the concept of a fail passive approach.  CAT III-C requires all systems to be operative including a dual autopilot function to assure the safety of landing, even if some systems fail during the most critical phase of the landing following  the concept of a fail operational approach.  ICOA defines CAT III-C as “a precision approach and landing with no decision height and no runway visual range limitations” (Airbus, 2001).

The execution of auto-land incurs higher requirements compared to other approaches; adequate aircraft equipment, adequate runway landing ILS (Instrument Landing System) facility, adequate flight crew training, and appropriate certification of the operator by the state.  Other restrictions include lower wind criteria, lower runway elevation, shallower approach gradient, and lower maximum landing weight compared to manual landings (Airbus, 2001).

The UAS (Unmanned Aerial Systems) readily exclude an onboard pilot.  An approach and landing can be remotely piloted from a distant post utilizing line-of-sight or instrument readings presented on the control console.  The dislocation of the pilot from the air vehicle removes most of the salient visual cues compared to landing a manned aircraft.  This makes the introduction of auto-land and auto-takeoff systems for UAS a reasonable method for routine operations.  UAS widely differ from manned aircraft on flying characteristics and performance aspects. Another difference is the operational theater may include unpaved runway strips and unpublished takeoff and landing procedures.

BAE systems developed an experimental UAS for testing FCS (Flight Control Systems) that will enable small UAS to carry out automated takeoff and landing.  The autopilot system was installed on a wing type propelled aircraft for demonstration purposes.  The navigation during takeoff and landing was carried out using a fusion of sensors like GPS receivers, laser altimeters, clinometers, and IMU (Inertial Measurement Unit).  The landing and takeoff maneuvers required robust control inputs to precisely guide the aircraft on the required vertical and horizontal trajectories in the presence of rapidly varying winds. The basic navigation relies on waypoint to waypoint sequencing (Riseborough, 2004).

References

Airbus (2001).  Getting to Grips with CAT II/ CAT III Operations.  Retrieved from skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/1480.pdf
Riseborough, P. (2004, July). Automatic take-off and landing control for small UAVs. In Control Conference, 2004. 5th Asian (Vol. 2, pp. 754-762). IEEE.

Research of Shift Work Schedule

A shift-work model involves three root causes that are responsible for a myriad of risks; circadian rhythm disturbances, sleep debt, and family/social problems.  In fact, these risk are recognized as symptoms of Shift work disorder (SWD), which is a clinically recognized condition that affect workers who work at during hours of circadian low or work on rotating shifts.

Vicious circle related to shift work

Despite the inherent risks, shift-work model is a significant work model across the US, and thus having a direct effect on a considerable sector of the population. The figure below is a flowchart of  the shift-work system and its associated risks.  The risks affect human performance and the quality of life, these in turn react in a vicious-circle to further aggravate the risks, unless the person introduces coping methods to alleviate the situation (Tvaryanas, Miller, Colebank, Platte, & Swigart, 2008).

Comorbidities of SWD

Studies indicate that patients of SWD are more susceptible to experience comorbodities.  The list includes metabolic and gastrointestinal disturbances, cardiovascular issues, cancer, reproductivity, sleep disorders, and anxiety disorders.  However, research did not show a direct relation to longevity (Culpepper, 2010).

Cognition and accidents

Cognitive abilities like learning, memory, concentration, and work performance are severely affected by sleep debt.  Studies reported that responses to visual stimulations were significantly affected on the start of a consecutive night-shift work schedule.  Accident potential is higher even at the first night during such a schedule.  In general, Shift workers are accident-prone; work related accidents are more likely to be associated by shift work, and commuters report a higher accident rate after a night shift compared to a day shift (Culpepper, 2010).
Shift work scheduling practices do not follow a well established criteria to achieve adequate rest for workers between shifts.  The shift length is usually indifferent of the start time.  On the other hand, the start time for shift workers are also indifferent of the timing of pervious or later shift.  Even in a airline schedules, where set laws are present to prevent fatigue, rapid changes between shift start times are a normal occurrence.

References

Culpepper, L. (2010). The social and economic burden of shift-work disorder. The Journal of Family Practice, 59(1 Suppl), S3.
Tvaryanas, A. P., Miller, N. L., Colebank, J., Platte, W., & Swigart, C. (2008). A resurvey of shift work-related fatigue in MQ-1 Predator unmanned aircraft system crewmembers.

BLOS UAS Operations

Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) operations are a key aspect in UAS operations.  The BLOS operating capability is a fundamental requirement to achieve the 4-D’s advantage of UAS operations (dirty, dangerous, dull, and deep).  The acquisition of the Predator system came to fulfill the requirement of the Department of Defense to acquire intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and strike (ISRS) capabilities.  It now represents a flagship of the US army's aerial capabilities.  The Predator’s ISRS capabilities rely on its satellite-based command, control, and communication (C3).  A Ku-band allows the ground crew who are based on U.S. territory to carry out continuous ISRS operations at hot zones half-way across the globe (U.S. Air Force, 2015).  The predator crew relies on displays in their ground control stations (GCS) to fly and navigate the air vehicle, and also operate the sensory or weapon payloads.

On the other hand, the launch and recovery operations of the Predator is carried out by an entirely different crew and datalink channel.  An onsite crew, handles the takeoff and landing of the air vehicle from a close proximity using a within line of sight (LOS) UHF communication channel.  These phases of flight are critical and cannot afford the communication latency inherent in satellite links.

Although the entire operational philosophy of the Predator system relies on BLOS C3 links, this communication mode has significant disadvantages.  Loss of Communication is a very serious issue that affects the safety of the system, as well as the execution of the mission.  Alternatively, the air vehicle will detect a loss of communication state and will execute a loiter pattern and may also execute a return to base (RTB).

Piloting a Predator air-vehicle using GCS controls involves a myriad of Human Factor (HF) issue.  The pilot inputs and consequent feedback are subject to considerable datalink delays.  The GCS provides the pilot with visual primary flight displays only.  Issues like situational awareness and fatigue are amongst the primary causes for Predator mishaps that are related to HF issues (Cuadra, 2014).

On the civilian platform the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) has held an adamant position about the requirement for a ground pilot to “see and avoid” throughout all the time that an UAS is being flown.  This implied that LOS are the only means to fly an UAS.  However, in December 2016, the FAA has granted a temporary approval for the Precision Hawk to test flight its detect and avoid system.  The small UAS is equipped with revolutionary sensory camera that enables the aircraft to avoid collision with other airspace users.  The FAA realizes the commercial demands to allow BLOS operations of UAS.  However, it is proceeding with careful steps until a comprehensive realization of associated risks is achieved and adequate measures are put in place to control those risks (PrecisionHawk, 2016).

References

Cuadra, A. W. (2014, June 14). How Drones are Controlled. Retrieved from The Washington Post: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/national/drone-crashes/how-drones-work/
PrecisionHawk,. (2016). PrecisionHawk Research Outlines Operations Risk for Drones Flying Beyond Line of Sight. Retrieved from www.precisionhawk.com/media/topic/precisionhawk-releases-faa-pathfinder-phase-2-data-at-uas-taac/
U.S. Air Force. (2015, September 23). Fact Sheets; MQ-1B Predator. Retrieved from Air Force.mil: http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104469/mq-1b-predator.aspx

UAS integration in the NAS

The Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) has become the flagship project of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).  Under NextGen, the national airspace (NAS) will undergone an overhaul of its current operations and protocols in order to harness the latest advances in information technology, communication, and satellite based navigation.  Some of the older navigational aids and protocols will become gradually abandoned (FAA, 2014).

The NextGen will enable the aviation industry to continue its expansion by enhancing the efficacy of all NAS operations. Some of the benefits include reduced delay time on ground, faster and more direct flight routes, enhanced distribution of realtime information to all users, reduction of the aviation industry environmental footprint, and improving the safety and security of all NAS users (FAA, 2014).

The advent of Unmanned Aerospace Systems (UAS), as an alternative and an expansion to classic manned aircraft applications, increased the complexity of the NextGen project.  The integration of UAS to the NAS was initially inhibited due to a lack of safety related requirements and formal criteria that govern UAS operations in the NAS.  The main challenges emerge from the lack of an onboard human operator to fulfill the see and avoid task, and the vast variations between different UAS in their onboard equipment and performance characteristics , 2012).

Sense and avoid is the ultimate controversy point that hinders unsegregated UAS operations in the NAS.  This issue is directly related to the regulatory definition of the sense and avoid responsibility being directly assigned to pilots of manned aircraft.  The issue is a research subject for many emerging technologies that are based on cooperative or non-cooperative technologies. This gap requires a modification of the current regulations, together with enhanced systems that can fulfill this task at a safety level acceptable for NAS users.
UAS require several communication channels depending on their operational range and the available communication modules onboard the air vehicle.  NextGen communication architecture did not account for the vast information demands that UAS incur during their operations.  Another important issue is the case of link lost.  In the realm of UAS control, a lost link may eventually result in losing control of the AV.  This has safety implications on the NAS users.  Alternatives include the execution of lost link contingency procedures, however, these procedures consist of a vast amount of information that are too lengthy in comparison to the flight plan formats currently in use.  This may result in complications to upload these plans to the appropriate ATC control centers (Paczan., Cooper, & Zakrzewski, 2012).

The NextGen provides a continuous exchange of information between all users.  UAS pilots who fly to observer AV operations will need to be able to receive operational and advisory information from all NAS users through NextGen information terminals.  One important aspect is the need to comply with design criteria and information representation like other NextGen users.  Ground Control Station design aspects must receive the required modifications to align the navigational display with NextGen standards.

References

FAA (2014). NextGe update: 2014. Retrieved from https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/media/NextGenUpdate2014.pdf
Paczan N., Cooper J.,Zakrzewski E. (2012), Integrating Unmanned Aircraft into NextGent Automation Systems.   (Paczan., Cooper, & Zakrzewski, 2012)
JOINT PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT OFFICE (JPDO). (2012). NextGen UAS research, development and demonstration roadmap. version 1.0

Case Analysis Effectiveness

The benefits of case analysis include topic research beyond the material offered in class.  While researching the topic of the case analysis, I exposed myself to a plethora of scholarly articles that expanded my knowledge about the subject, its challenges, and an updated insight.

Unfortunately, my current career, an airline captain, does not involve research and academic writing.  In the future, I expect to undertake safety roles within the airline where case analysis studies will be a valuable tool.  Another future venture will be continuous education towards a PhD where case analysis will be a corner stone in such a demanding academic endeavor. 

The case analysis proposal came early by the second week of the course.  The material offered in the course is rich and tackles subjects that are not intuitively related to the realm of UAS.  Hence, the student cannot possibly foresee how the subject will develop to contain the prospective learning outcomes.  The required paper is lengthy and a shorter paper can produce the same learning outcome.

Writing an abstract about a topic that is underdevelopment was challenging. The peer reviews on the rough draft contributed greatly to the structure and the content of the paper.